

Message Text

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SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PRS-01 L-03 IO-13

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8981

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 09858

DEPARTMENT FOR KATES AF/C

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, GW, US, CF, RH, SF, WA, AO

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE DISCUSSES

AFRICAN POLICY WITH FOREIGN OFFICE

REFS: (A) KATES/MOATS TELECON (6/9/77); (B) BONN 9536

1. ON AFTERNOON JUNE 6, AFTER COMPLETING NEGOTIATIONS ON NORMALIZATION OF CONGO-U.S. RELATIONS WITH CONGOLESE DELEGATION IN BONN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE MET FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR WITH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN AND POLICY TOWARD AFRICA. PRESENT ON THE GERMAN SIDE WERE STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DR. JESSER, AND OFFICE DIRECTORS FOR AFRICA WEVER (WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA) AND VON SCHACKY (ACTING DIRECTOR, EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA). ASSISTANT SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER CASH, CONGOLESE DESK OFFICER KATES, AND POLITICAL OFFICER MOATS.

2. AFTER GREETINGS BY VAN WELL, SCHAUFLE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY
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THE FRG IN SETTING UP THE MEETING WITH CONGOLESE. SCHAUFLE THEN BRIEFLY OUTLINED COURSE OF MORNING'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CONGOLESE AND GAVE VAN WELL A COPY OF EMBARGOED COMMUNIQUE (PARA 3, REF B) ON FYI BASIS AND COPY OF PRESS RELEASE (PARA 4, REF B) WHICH WAS ISSUED BY FOREIGN OFFICE LATE JUNE 6.

3. ENSUING CONVERSATION COVERED FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

-- CONGO: VAN WELL NOTED THAT CONGOLESE FOREIGN MINISTER OBENGA HAD INTIMATED TO THE GERMAN SIDE THAT THE CONGOLESE WOULD FIRST SEEK NORMALIZED POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THEN PURSUE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC AID. PRESENT FRG AID TO THE CONGO WAS LIMITED TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SINCE OUTSTANDING DEBTS (APPROX. DM 10 MILLION) BARRED CONSIDERATION OF FURTHER CAPITAL AID. SCHAUFLE OBSERVED THAT OBENGA HAD NOT ASKED FOR AID BUT THAT THE U.S. WOULD PROBABLY GIVE SOME ASSISTANCE EVENTUALLY; IT WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF PROJECTS, ETC., SINCE BUDGETARY AID SEEMED OUT OF THE PICTURE. VAN WELL STATED THAT IT WAS IN WESTERN INTERESTS TO MAKE THE CONGO "MORE NON-ALLIGNED THAN BEFORE" AND RESCHEDULING OF CONGOLESE DEBTS WAS VITAL TO THIS DEVELOPMENT. VAN WELL MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT APPROACH BY THE MAJOR WESTERN LENDERS (FRANCE, U.S., FRG) OR, IF THE CONGOLESE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS, A SERIES OF "MULTI-BILATERAL" DISCUSSIONS. WEVER ADDED THAT A CONGOLESE DELEGATION WAS EXPECTED SOON IN BONN TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

-- ANGOLA: WEVER TOLD THE GROUP THAT OBENGA, IN HIS TALKS EARLIER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, HAD ATTRIBUTED THE CURRENT DISTURBANCES IN ANGOLA TO ATTEMPTS TO OUST THE CUBAN INFLUENCE. SCHAUFLE REMARKED THAT FROM HIS TALKS WITH OBENGA EARLIER IN THE DAY, HE INFERRED THAT OBENGA SAW CONFIDENTIAL

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THE ANGOLAN SITUATION ALSO AS A PROBLEM OF RACE. BLACKS IN ANGOLA VIEW THE CUBANS AS KEEPING NETO, A MULATTO, IN POWER. THE FRG WAS RECEIVING CONTRADICTORY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION, VAN WELL SAID. SOME REPORTS CLAIMED NETO WAS BELIEVED TOO CLOSE TO THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS AND THE OPPOSITION WANTED MORE INDEPENDENCE; OTHER SOURCES CLAIMED JUST THE OPPOSITE. IN VAN WELL'S VIEW, THE SITUATION COULD BEST BE DESCRIBED AS A POWER STRUGGLE, IN WHICH RACE PLAYS A ROLE.

VAN WELL DISCLOSED THAT OBENGA, WHILE HE WAS IN BONN, ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FRG AND ANGOLA. OBENGA WAS TOLD THAT THE ANGOLAN RESPONSE TO A GERMAN CABLE OFFERING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAD NOT BEEN FRIENDLY. OBENGA OFFERED TO INTERCEDE, AS HE HAD WITH THE FRENCH, AND WAS TOLD THE FRG WAS STILL INTERESTED IN EXCHANGING AMBASSADORS WITH THE ANGOLANS. IF OBENGA WANTED TO PASS THIS

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MESSAGE TO THEM, THIS WOULD NOT BE OBJECTED TO BY THE
GERMAN SIDE. VAN WELL ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT THE
FRG HAD ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO SUPPORT THE MPLA, BUT HAD
NOT IN DEFERENCE TO THE STRONG VIEWS HELD BY ITS EC
PARTNERS AND THE US.

-- SOUTHERN AFRICA: VAN WELL BEGAN BY NOTING THAT
THE WEST HAS GAINED SOME GROUND IN AFRICA RECENTLY.
THE WEST, HOWEVER, MUST BE CAREFUL ABOUT ATTENDING TO
ITS PRIORITIES OR THESE GAINS COULD BE LOST. THE
NUMBER ONE PRIORITY IS INSURING THE PEACEFUL
TRANSFER OF POWER IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA. HE WARNED
THAT IF IT APPEARS THE WEST HAS APARTHEID, INSTEAD, AS ITS
PRIORITY GOAL, PROGRESS ON REAL OBJECTIVES WILL BE
BLOCKED, BECAUSE THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL FEEL "BACKED
INTO A CORNER" AND CUT OFF MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS.
VAN WELL SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET
EXPLOITATION OF WESTERN "FAILURES" IN OTHER AREAS --
I.E., THE SETBACK IN CIEC IN PARIS AND A POSSIBLE
HARDENING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER, THE FRG WOULD
LIKE TO CONTINUE MOVING ALONG THE NEGOTIATION PATH.
SPECIFICALLY FOR THE FRG, THIS MEANT PUSHING FORWARD
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ON THE NAMIBIA TALKS, SUPPORTING THE U.S. AND BRITAIN
IN RHODESIA, PROMOTING THE RESULTS OF MAPUTO, AND
CONTAINING THE NEGATIVE AFFECTS OF PARIS.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFELLE REPLIED THAT THE U.S.
VIEWED IT AS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE PROGRESS IN
NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA CONTINUE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
THERE WERE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THE USG CONCERNING
POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT ADDED THAT OUR
ATTENTION WAS FOCUSED ON NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA. THERE
WAS PRESSURE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION NOT TO "SOFT
PEDAL" ON SOUTH AFRICA, BUT HE ADDED THAT IF THE U.S.
INTENDED TO CHANGE THIS FOCUS, IT SHOULD CONSULT WITH
THE FRG AND OTHER ALLIES. IN ANY CASE, NOTHING WAS
LIKELY TO HAPPEN QUICKLY. SCHAUFELLE REMARKED THAT
THE U.S. HAD PERCEIVED SOME BACKTRACKING IN VIENNA ON
THE PART OF VORSTER, BUT THAT THIS REMAINED TO BE
TESTED. THE U.S. AGREED THAT THE PARIS CONFERENCE WAS
SOMEWHAT DISCOURAGING BUT SCHAUFELLE ADDED THAT HE DID
NOT BELIEVE THE AFRICANS WERE UNDULY UPSET BY THE
RESULTS.

-- NAMIBIA: VAN WELL SAID THAT THE FRG HAD DECIDED
TO CLOSE ITS CONSULATE IN WINDHOEK. THE QUESTION OF
PROTECTION OF THE ETHNIC GERMANS STILL PRESENT MUST
STILL BE DISCUSSED WITH SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES,
BUT THE FRG CONSIDERED IT MORE IMPORTANT TO HAVE A
PRESENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE THAN BEFORE AND THIS MEANT
CLOSING THE CONSULATE NOW. SWAPO'S REACTION TO THE
CLOSURE IS UNCERTAIN AND ZAMBIA'S PRESIDENT KAUNDA
HAD BEEN CONSULTED ON HOW CLOSURE COULD BE PRESENTED SO
AS TO GET THE BEST RECEPTION FROM SWAPO. VAN WELL NOTED
THAT THE FRG COALITION EXPECTED SOME DOMESTIC POLITICAL
FLAK AS A RESULT OF ITS DECISION.

IN VAN WELL'S VIEW, THE GREATEST QUESTION IS HOW TO
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PHASE OUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA. THE
SOUTH AFRICANS FEAR TOTAL CHAOS IF THEY WITHDRAW,
ESPECIALLY SINCE WITHDRAWAL WOULD MEAN THE
ELIMINATION OF THE "CORDON SANITAIRE" VIS-A-VIS ANGOLA.
SCHAUFELLE AGREED THAT THIS WAS A CRUCIAL AND DIFFICULT
POINT. A PRECIPITOUS SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL COULD
LEAD TO THE IMPOSITION OF SWAPO, WHICH WOULD BE
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SAG. NEVERTHELESS, A PHASED WITH-
DRAWAL MAY NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO EITHER SOUTH AFRICA
OR SWAPO. IF SWAPO SENSED IT COULD GAIN POWER THROUGH

A QUICK WITHDRAWAL, HOWEVER, IT PROBABLY WOULD INSIST ON IT. A UN PRESENCE ALSO COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. IN ANY CASE, SCHAUFLELE NOTED, HE EXPECTED A PRELIMINARY REACTION FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS WHEN THEY MET WITH THE CG IN CAPE TOWN LATER IN THE WEEK. HE WOULD VIEW IT AS A PARTIAL SUCCESS IF THE SAG PARLIAMENT PASSED THE ENABLING LEGISLATION NEEDED FOR PROGRESS. THERE WAS STILL SOME ROOM FOR MANEUVER.

VAN WELL SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF "RUMORS" CONCERNING PROPOSALS TO FORM AN INDEPENDENT ARMED FORCE FOR NAMIBIA COMPOSED OF NAMIBIAN SOLDIERS NOW IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FORCES. SCHAUFLELE RESPONDED THAT SUCH A FORMULATION MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO SWAPO.

VAN WELL AGAIN BROUGHT THE CONVERSATION BACK TO THE

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QUESTION OF PRIORITIES. THE WEST MUST NOT CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS PUSHING IN ALL THREE FRONTS AT ONCE, HE SAID. IF WE PUSHED FOR CHANGE IN NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA AND ON APARTHEID TOO, THIS MIGHT BE TOO MUCH FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO ACCEPT. THE WEST AND THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAD INVESTED TOO MUCH PRESTIGE, IN VAN WELL'S VIEW, TO LET THE TALKS BECOME STALEMATED NOW.

-- THE HORN: VAN WELL SAID THAT THE HORN OF AFRICA WAS A DILEMMA FOR THE FRG. SOME MODERATE ARAB STATES HAVE APPROACHED THE FRG ABOUT EXPANDING ITS CONTACTS WITH SOMALIA BUT SOMALI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FRG ARE UNCLEAR AT THE PRESENT TIME. FURTHERMORE, BONN HAS BEEN APPROACHED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF TWO OF THE ERITREAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. DEALING WITH THEM THREATENS TO OPEN THE PANDORA'S BOX OF AFRICAN FRONTIERS.

SCHAUFLE REPLIED THAT HE WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISED BY THE VISIT OF THE NEW SOMALI VICE PRESIDENT TO MOSCOW, BUT THAT ONE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE EXTENT OF SOVIET CONFIDENTIAL

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PENETRATION OF THE SOMALI BUREAUCRACY. IN ORDER TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN COAXING THE SOMALIS AWAY FROM THE SOVIETS, THE WEST MUST WORK WITH A VERY FEW PEOPLE, AND THIS NECESSITATES A SLOW PACE. THE U.S. HAS TALKED WITH EGYPT, THE SUDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SUBJECT. THEY WANT US TO BE FORTHCOMING TOWARD THE SOMALIS AND WE ARE WILLING TO BE.

CONCERNING THE ERITREAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, THE U.S. HAS ALSO BEEN APPROACHED, SCHAUFLE SAID. THE U.S. NEITHER DISCOURAGES NOR ENCOURAGES THESE APPROACHES. THE U.S. IS PRESENTLY FORMULATING ITS POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE HORN, SINCE IT WOULD INVOLVE MILITARY AS WELL AS ECONOMIC AID. PRESIDENT SAID, IN TALKS WITH THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING, BUT UNWILLING TO MOVE TOO FAST. A U.S. AID DELEGATION WAS RECENTLY IN SOMALIA AND IDENTIFIED SOME PROJECTS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE. SCHAUFLE OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MAY BE CONGRESSIONAL RESISTANCE TO SHIFTING U.S. PRIORITIES FROM ETHIOPIA TO SOMALIA.

SCHAUFLE ASKED THE GERMAN SIDE WHAT THE FRG COULD DO IN PROVIDING VEHICLES TO SOMALIA. JESSER REPLIED THAT FRG ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA TOTALED ONLY ABOUT DM 5 MILLION OVER THREE YEARS AND INCLUDED NON-MILITARY TRUCKS, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, ETC. VAN WELL NOTED THAT THE MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION WOULD BALK AT SENDING TRUCKS TO THE DEFENSE FORCES, BUT THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD A SPECIAL FUND FOR EQUIPMENT AID WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE USED FOR SUCH PURPOSES.

4. IN CLOSING, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE AGAIN THANKED THE FRG FOR ITS HELP IN FACILITATING THE TALKS WITH THE CONGOLESE AND, NOTING VAN WELL'S DESIRE FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION, UNDERTOOK TO RECOMMEND TO HIS

SUCCESSORS THAT MORE FREQUENT BILATERAL TALKS BE
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5. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS THIS CABLE TO OTHER
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